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The globalization of the world economy poses major challenges to the prevailing 
international economic system. The recent trade-investment system raises the issues of 
the marginalization of countries, firms, and agents if they are not capable to compete 
with large successful entities. The system engenders conflicts of interest in its interfacing 
with sovereign domains. In numerous cases such as employment and mutual trade 
benefits, it can produce zero sum outcomes. Consequently, significant segments of public 
opinion in many countries have mobilized against it. In the monetary and financial area, 
the system has from 1945 evolved on a piecemeal and ad hoc basis. In recent years, it has 
not been able to predict, prevent or effectively deal with financial crisis. It demonstrates a 
lacuna in global financial governance especially with respect to enforcing its rules on the 
major countries and bringing the private sector therein. The central institution, the IMF, 
is shown to be in need of basic reforms involving forging a global vision, reconsidering 
and updating conditionality, further democratization of political governance, and 





The prevailing international economic arrangements are an amalgam of facts, rules and modalities 
created one at a time rather than as a holistic system of cohesive design. The monetary part is a 
transformation of the old Bretton Woods system, which came into actual collapse in August 1971, but 
was rescued by successive fixes from 1972 onward. It remains based on the United States dollar, and 
centred around the IMF
1 whose mission and philosophy have evolved at a politically controlled pace. 
The monetary and financial systems are covered institutionally by the IMF in monetary matters and by 
the World Bank in finance matters. Moreover, the World Bank, while an important source of 
development funds for the poor countries and an instrument for bringing their policies under the 
scrutiny of the dominant members, shares its role, de facto, with the private sector, which is, de jure, 
not a part of the official system and is in the business of profit making. 
 
The trade part of these arrangements, issuing essentially from the GATT, was redesigned in its scope 
and its law by the WTO agreement. However, it has maintained numerous features of the old GATT; it 
is still based on the exercise of full sovereignty in granting or not granting concessions; it remains 
essentially one based on liberal trade access, on non–discrimination in treatment via the application of 
the most favoured nation clause; and it is now based on equal treatment of countries regardless of their 
trading capacities. There is yet no sub-system for dealing directly and explicitly with investments and 
the transfer of technology. 
                                                      
* The author is a former UNCTAD Director of Economic Cooperation, Proverty Alleviation and Special Programmes and 
Adjunct Professor of Finance and Economics in Thunderbird Europe and Webster University in Geneva. He continues to 
work as consultant to the United Nations, the European Union and Swiss private banks. 
1 See glossary of abbreviations. p. iv.   
 
2 
The overarching theme of this paper is that some parts of the international system have become, under 
globalization, rather obsolete and sometimes mutually inconsistent. The system has shown itself 
incapable of anticipating or preventing financial crisis in a global economy. There is also a glaring 
asymmetry in the treatment of source and recipient countries. Alternatives and reform ideas are 
suggested with full cognisance of their political feasibility and analytic soundness. 
 
The conclusions of this paper are as follows: 
 
•  The globalization process cuts into the sovereign control of Nation States and to a certain extent 
erodes their fiscal base, while imposing costly burdens and obligations upon them to husband 
and develop their productive capacities and preserve their respective social compacts. It also 
reduces their scope of policy choice. 
 
•  The system has an obvious need for international governance, but its major Nation States do not 
accept the implied limits on their sovereignties. 
 
•  Globalization confers considerable benefits upon the participants, but it pays no attention to 
developing production, technological and commercial capacities. Thus, it may lead to the 
marginalization of some States, firms and individuals. 
 
•  The WTO system, which is based on equal treatment and unfettered sovereign granting of 
concessions, in effect provides level playing field only to participants with equal trading 
capacities or with equal value of concessions. Some aspects of this system disallow, for 
example, environmental and industrial policies, thereby infringing upon domestic Nation State 
decision making and putting in question the objectives and purposes of domestic policies 
wherever they have international effects. 
 
•  The short run incidence of trade globalization might be harmful to employment in the job losing 
countries, with the result of placing globalization in domestic political contention.  
 
•  The globalization of financial flows and investments might enhance allocative efficiency, but it 
skews further equity and fairness in the use of international savings and might undermine 
macroeconomic discipline. 
 
•  The private sector is not brought into the system in a meaningful way, especially in the areas of 
handling financial crisis and working out debt problems. There is also a system lacuna in 
devising binding acceptable standards of behavior for private foreign investors who are critical 
actors in the stability of the global financial system. 
 
•  There is a manifest need to reform the IMF and bring up to date its conditionality, governance 
and surveillance functions as well as endowing it with the function of the bank of last resort. 
 
•  The empirical record of the exchange rate system and the balance of arguments about it, call for 





It would do injustice to the issues involved to try to deal with all the issues at the same level of depth 
within the limited scope of this paper. Nevertheless, an attempt will be made to cover, with varying 
detail, a certain number of outstanding issues. 
 
The paper is divided into two sections. Section I covers the “problematique” of globalization and 
examines the tensions and contradictions experienced in the three subsystems: trade, investment-
production and transfer of technology. It also discusses the conflict between the international system 
and the national sovereign systems. Section II covers the international monetary system (IMS) and its 
managing institution, the IMF in more detail because of the interconnection of the issues involved and 
the technical nexus between them.  
 
 
I.  THE PROBLEMATIQUE OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM 
 
A.  The different facets of globalization and their manifestations 
 
Globalization is manifested in four interrelated developments: (1) the increase in the international 
exchange of goods and services and the movements of human resources despite all the restrictions 
therein; (2) the internationalization of production and real investments; (3) the increased integration of 
financial markets; and (4) the relatively high degree of policy convergence among countries.
2 
 
The statistical evidence on these developments is truly impressive. In the trade area, the ratio of 
international trade to the GDP of practically all countries has more than doubled over the last two 
decades. Trade has substantially outpaced the growth of the GDP in all but very few years over the 
past 25 years. A major new phenomenon is the size of services in total trade, in particular financial 
services. 
 
World trade grew at a real rate per annum of 5.5 per cent in 1985–1994. In the decade 1995–2004 it 
registered an annual real growth of 6 per cent.
3 This is well above the average growth of the GDP in 
the same periods. For individual countries, even in the large and relatively closed countries, there is 
the same trend. For example, in the United States, trade went from a mere 9 per cent of the United 
States GDP in 1970 to more than 23 per cent in 2003. In the small European countries and most of the 
small developing countries, trade has gone up from levels in the range of 40–50 per cent of the GDP in 
1970 to levels in the range of 80–90 per cent in 2003. The increased importance of trade relative to the 
GDP is particularly striking in the developing countries. The twenty developing countries classified by 
an UNCTAD paper as the most dynamic have increased their share in total world exports from 9.5 per 
cent in 1980 to 24.3 per cent in 1998.
4 This is all the more impressive in view of the large growth of 
exports. 
 
                                                      
2 Financial market integration implies that securities of the same risk and characteristics are substitutes for each other. This 
would empirically mean that the uncovered margin theory should hold. The empirical tests, however, show that the margins 
are exceeded in most cases. Nonetheless, the violation of the condition does not run wide margins. One can conclude that 
financial market integration is high but less than perfect. For a review of the evidence see Daniels and Van Hoose 2002, 
Chapter 6, pp. 171–189. 
3 IMF 2003a, table on p. 201. 
4 Akyuz 2003, Chapter 1, p. 8.  
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In the exchange of human resources, the movement of labour across international borders, legally or 
illegally, together with the growth of immigration from poor to rich countries have reached such levels 
that immigration has become an explosive political issue in all the recent political campaigns of 
Western Europe. In the United States, a traditional country of immigration, the increased scale of 
economic immigration is beginning to be a standard feature of political campaigns and is heavily 
exploited by politicians in quest of electoral gains. 
 
In the investment-cum-production area, the internationalization of production is currently manifest in 
the phenomenal increase of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the United States, in Europe, and in 
some twenty or so developing countries led by China. For example, China has experienced investment 
inflows reaching 7.9 per cent of the GDP in 1993 and 8.1 in 2003. This has taken place against the 
backdrop of real annual growth of China’s GDP of 8–9 per cent. In some smaller economies, like 
Malaysia, these inflows had reached a high of 14.6 per cent of the GDP in1993.
5 After dipping in 1997 
and 1998, net inflows bounced back, but have not resumed a steady pace of growth after 2001. There 




In the finance arena, businesses have increased their recourse to international sources as testified by 
the increased volume of flotation of foreign bond; the increased issuance of international bonds in the 
Euro markets, and the increased international lending in direct and indirect forms. Moreover, big 
companies have substantially increased their stock listings on the various public exchanges.
7  
 
The financial institutions, led by banks, have become truly international not only in doing international 
financing like their predecessors have done since the nineteenth century, but in addition, by locating in 
various countries through sometimes outright establishment or acquisition of local banks. On both the 
assets and liability sides of their balance sheets, banking is now international: loans and deposits are 
denominated in different currencies originating from and going to different points of the globe. 
 
Just as telling perhaps but more typical, is the increased convergence of economic policies of 
governments. This is the result of several factors. First the complete triumph of the liberal model has 
narrowed the scope of choice in economic policies. All countries want to be seen pursuing the right 
policy model. Second is the emulate-thy-competitor syndrome. Countries match the concessions and 
benefits given by their competitors to foreign investors and transnational firms in order not to suffer a 
comparative disadvantage. Third is the relative short time the world has had to fashion policies based 
on some variations on the orthodox liberal model. The policy convergence however is stronger among 
smaller economies than the big ones because the big economies quite frequently pursue policies 
dictated by short term expediencies.  
 
The spotty results of the government controlled model, already clear in the 1980’s, and the collapse of 
the socialist economies in 1989, have brought about an almost universal acceptance of liberal and open 
market organization and a semi-consensus on economic policies. A rather extreme version emerged in 
the so-called “Washington Consensus”. This was so called after the meeting in Washington of 
economists with views concordant with those of the IMF (the Fund) and the World Bank as to what 
model of economic policy to follow. Notwithstanding the challenge to this consensus by various other 
                                                      
5 See Woodward 1996, Table 3.1. 
6 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1996 and 2003. 




8 there is a wide convergence of views today on what are bad policies and a spectrum of 
accord on what are good ones. 
 
B.  The problems and challenges of globalization 
 
If globalization is a non-stoppable train as many argue, it seems to be a rather selective one in 
admitting passengers aboard. Economies having skilled and educated manpower and endowed with 
well developed production and marketing capacities can get on board and be able to reap significant 
benefits if they have developed financial systems and access to technology. It is a system where the 
benefits accrue only to the capable and prepared. Those who do not have the products and services to 
sell or the means to market them will assuredly be left on the platform. The same is also true for 
individuals who have not invested in their human capital and have not obtained the requisite skills for 
global employment market. Thus, we are faced with the phenomenon of marginalization of people, of 
firms and of countries. The global system confers a large rent differential upon the participants and 
applies exclusion to non-participants.
9 Unless the means to spread around wealth and prosperity are 
built into the phenomenon of globalization, it will become the domain of the already established, of 
the capable and the skilled. Consequently, enabling capacity building in trade, technology and human 
capital is an important issue in the debate on globalization. Unlike export orientation, globalization 
involves the entire resource base and know-how of the economic agents. Thus, participatory capacity 
is an important issue. 
 
Faced with the reality of the requirements of the global economy, Nation States confront a host of 
problems. They have to accept the relative loss of sovereign control and the erosion of the fiscal base 
if they want to keep up with competitors who grant tax holidays and waive social charges. At the same 
time, in order to enter into or to keep their presence in the global system they are forced to increase 
expenditure on infrastructure and education. To all these must be added the consequence of accepting 
global openness: national governments must install domestic safety nets to diminish the casualties of 
globalization – be it firms, banks or workers – if they are to maintain the social compact and preserve 
civil peace. These are contradictory demands on national governments. 
 
Another problem concerns the timing and location of the short run benefits and losses in the trade 
sector. While the countries with higher wages and more exigent environmental standards stand to lose 
jobs as businesses shift some branches of industry toward cheaper locations abroad, higher paying jobs 
have not followed the lost ones in the short run. The theory of international trade asserts that higher 
value added jobs would replace the lost ones. But the theory does not have a clear timeline for 
working out of comparative advantage; it has always assumed that the replacement technology is 
                                                      
8  Joseph Stiglitz, the Nobel laureate, is a leading critic of the Washington Consensus. This has come to represent the 
collective views of many economists gathered around the Bretton Woods institutions, as to what should be the correct model 
of economic policies. Stiglitz and others like him do not agree that the liberal model followed by the IMF and the World 
Bank, is applicable in every case, and if so in the same way. On this view, it is argued that country specific circumstances and 
the complexity of the development process would call for nuanced and multi-dimensional paradigms that are suited to the 
particularities of various countries. In particular they disagree with the Consensus regarding the role of Government and the 
unadulterated application of the liberal model (Stiglitz 2002). Dani Rodrik of Harvard University expresses amazement as to 
how the IMF can still maintain a one-fit-all model, now that we begin to understand how and why things work in some 
countries but not in others (Rodrik 1999). 
9 This evaluation of globalization is not accepted by everyone. There are some who argue that in some areas like agriculture 
poor countries would stand to reap great benefits from globalization. However, the research on the implications of removing 
the European agricultural subsidies CAP shows that not all poor countries stand to benefit from it. The example of 
Bangladesh in textile is brought up to bolster this view for industrial sectors. The author holds that the case of Bangladesh 
presents a country well prepared in one specific area and is not in contradiction with the position of this paper. See UNCTAD 
1996b and UNCTAD 1996c for a general summary of globalization and its implications. For a nuanced view, see Rodrik 




available and the costs of conversion, in particular labour retraining, are insignificant. Obviously this 
is not so when replacement technologies are the private property of businesses which no longer have 
national allegiance and will use the technology and locate the jobs where they make the most profit. In 
today’s world, the major concern of businesses is the overall global bottom line and the increase in the 
wealth of the stockholders.  
 
The empirical evidence on industry replacement is hardly clear-cut in the short run. In the United 
States, evidence for the period 1992–2004 shows that the number of jobs that were lost is less than the 
number of jobs newly created.
10 This is true for the given period, but not necessarily true for a 
particular year. In the short run, job replacement seems to carry with it some complications. First, even 
when international firms own or have access to new technology, the relative cost difference between 
different locations might tempt them to relocate some jobs abroad. There is evidence on that in the low 
white collar jobs such as software and high information skill jobs. Countries such as India, which have 
invested in education and developed a large and surplus stock of skilled manpower, have succeeded in 
attracting lost jobs from global businesses on account of their low wages. Traditionally, wage levels 
and productivity gains have moved together. However, with openness it is possible that higher 
productivity might be associated with lower wages for skilled unemployed workers in a different 
country. We have therefore a break in the observed historical association between wages and 
productivity across countries with different cost of living. The historical pattern of investment in 
education is now playing a large role in the working out of the law of comparative advantage.  
 
Second, the new jobs generated in the United States have an average hourly pay that is lower than the 
jobs lost. In fact, quite a number of the new jobs are in the services sector, with lower productivity and 
lower wage rates, than lost manufacturing jobs. For example the average hourly wage in some of the 
fastest growing service jobs, the food industry, is $10.64 with a median of $8.98 per hour, as 
compared to $18.07 mean and $17.10 median hourly wages for the lost jobs in production, 
construction and extraction works.
11 To be sure, information technology will eventually decrease its 
cost per unit thereby raising productivity in the service branches; but that will essentially be in the 
long run.  
 
Third, surveys indicate that better paying replacement jobs at the higher end of wages in the services 
industry require higher information technology and education contents than the educational 
attainments of the replaced workers. On the other hand, available replacement jobs in the same sector, 
e.g. manufacturing, turn up in processes of considerable electronic and information complexity.
12 
These two empirical observations mean that considerable personal retooling and educational 
development may be required to replace lost jobs. That would increase the cost of job retraining and 
even put replacement jobs beyond the reach of many former older workers. Hence, the simplistic 
application of the principle of comparative advantage would mask the significant losses to workers in 
the short run in particular countries.
13 Consequently, there are transitional costs to job migration that 
continue to be borne by displaced workers.  
 
                                                      
10 United States Department of Labor 2004a. 
11 United States Department of Labor 2004b. 
12 Raushenberger 2005. 
13 For a discussion of the empirical evidence in the United States on job loses and creations, and for a rather traditional free 
trade argument see the Economist, 14 February 2004. In this context, it is to be recalled how Greg Mankiw the top economic 
advisor to President Bush, received very cool reception from both parties in Congress when he used traditional comparative 
advantage to defend free trade and the NAFTA. For further discussion on the evidence see Glyn 2005. UNCTAD, using 
earlier data, also had reached similar conclusions (UNCTAD Trade and Development Report 1995).  
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There are also costly structural impediments to the transition to new jobs. Politicians and labour 
unions are highly adept at juxtaposing these costs to the immediate benefits accruing to the economies 
in which the new jobs are located. As a result of this non zero-sum country outcome, there has been a 
loud cry about the hollowing out in the United States. The risk of creating significant constituencies in 
democratic countries opposed to globalization, as witnessed in Genoa and Seattle, is becoming quite 
high. And that would render trade issues ever more contentious and at obvious tension with the social 
compact. The recent debate in the United States presidential race of 2004 with respect to open trade is 
a case in point. The same can be said of the recent debates on the constitution of the European Union 
in France and in the Netherlands.  
 
It is evident that globalization necessitates both a large degree of international cooperation and 
coordination and an evolved consensus on international rules of behavior and codes of conduct. The 
inevitable consequence is the increased role of international organizations. However, this role is not 
welcomed by many of the major players. Nation States, especially big ones such as the United States, 
are not willing to follow international rules or to accept to cede sovereignty to international bodies 
when that does not suit their interests or when these impede their freedom of action. Thus, we are 
faced with the great conflict between the need for a global system of international governance on the 
one hand, and on the other, the refusal of major sovereign states to accept or even contemplate on the 
loss of sovereign control. 
 
Finally, the asymmetric distribution of benefits across countries is breeding theories about disguised 
and new forms of economic domination under globalization. Even though such views are often not 
empirically demonstrated, nonetheless, they are voiced by important segments in open societies, which 
have become permanent and non-discriminating opponents of WTO and globalization. 
 
C.  Investment, transfer of technology and global business 
 
Transnational investment in both its forms – portfolio and foreign direct investment (FDI), has become 
a striking feature of globalization. Net external worldwide financing has gone up from less than $10 
billion in the early 1970s to a high of $243 billion in 1996. It receded in 2001 from these historical 
heights but reached an estimated $148 in 2003 and a forecast of $149 billion in 2004.
14 Portfolio 
investment, foreign direct investment and external borrowing all exhibit the same trend.
15 These 
impressive figures mask to a certain extent the scale of the growth of gross inflows in the net receiving 
countries because the data are in aggregate net terms. Despite that, the figures remain quite impressive. 
In some developing countries such as China, trans-border investments, largely emanating from 
overseas Chinese investors, have accounted for 10–12 per cent of fixed capital formation. 
Consequently, they rendered possible the sustained high growth of the country over the last three 
decades. With few exceptions in closed economies, all countries developed and developing now 
welcome such investments, especially in the form of FDI.  
 
The competition for foreign investment is keen enough that countries resort to competitive 
concessions and stills more uniformity in macroeconomic policies to attract the investors. The 
potential benefits of foreign investment as a supplement to domestic savings, as a source of technology 
transfer in the case of FDI and as a more efficient use of savings world wide, are undeniable. But such 
investments raise questions for the global system. In the case of portfolio investment, the Asian crisis 
has graphically shown how the wave can turn around, and cause panic flights of capital engendering 
                                                      
14 IMF 2003b, Statistical Appendix, Table 33, p. 219. 
15 IMF, op. cit., p. 219.  
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balance of payments difficulties and currency crisis in the host countries. The work of Eichengreen 
cited below shows that such crises are usually at a scale much beyond the host country capacity to 
handle.
16 In the case of Latin America, the portfolio investment that poured into recipient countries, 
such as Argentina, did not translate into large real investment and higher economic growth; it went 
into the stock market and bank liabilities and subsequently disengaged with the same ease and speed.
17 
This is essentially because there are no rules of the game or binding code on private investors except 
that of profit making and risk avoidance.  
 
The Latin American and Asian crises also illustrate that there is sometimes a conflict between the 
interests of the investor and the host country. This is a long-standing problem raised throughout the 
failed negotiations of the Transnational Code in UNCTAD. Interestingly, while the UN based 
negotiations failed to produce a universal code of conduct, the OECD countries did succeed in 
approving the so called, “Guide Lines”, for their multinational corporate investments in 2000, and 
further approved the “Principles of Corporate Governance” in 2004. However, the question remains as 
to how such voluntary provisions without mandatory enforcement can become universal and binding 
on the transnational corporations (TNCs) in developing countries.  
 
In this context, a world with massive cross-border flows might produce a more efficient allocation of 
investments; but it can also very well produce an unjust pattern in the use of international savings. It 
might also lead to laxity in the macroeconomic system where the global flow of investment funds 
undermines one particular aspect of macroeconomics discipline: – the identity between domestic 
savings and investments in the long-run income equation. Feldstein and Herioka have observed how 
the inadequate domestic savings of the United States in the 1980s did not stop the Reagan 
Administration from massively borrowing the savings of the rest of the world in order to finance the 
increase of its military budget thereby modifying the income equality.
18 Obviously, if global savings 
have to be allocated fairly, the developing countries ought to have an important share in them. In 
effect, there is nothing in the system that would stop a highly developed country like the United States 
from borrowing, inter alia, developing country savings if it can pay the going international market rate 
which is determined by the domestic interest rates of the big economies. 
 
Another asymmetry is implicit in the agreement on TRIPS as negotiated in the WTO package. It 
protects the property rights of owners but does not fully address the twin issues of the impact of the 
protections on transfer of technology to developing countries, and the need to make possible and 
feasible the acquisition of drugs indispensable for public health. Quite naturally, the incidence of R&D 
favours the rich countries with their established capacity to develop and apply new technology and to 
use qualified cadres of educated people from all over the world. Since all new technology is 
essentially in private business hands, the TRIPS confirm the exclusion principle of the market place 
internationally. The AIDS crisis in Africa and the recent disputes between governments and drug 
companies protected by the certificates of intellectual property rights are examples in point. There is 
thus an undeniable need to bring the private holders of copyright, mostly the big transnationals, into 
some system of internationally controlled exploitation where, as a quid pro quo for copyright 
protection, they adhere to an internationally agreed code of behavior. 
 
                                                      
16 Barry Eichengreen in a recent paper for the Copenhagen Consensus calculates the losses from the Asian crisis 
at some 20 per cent of the GDP of Indonesia. He also calculates that the benefit from avoiding such crisis can 
save $107 billion a year. The Economist cites an authoritative study to the effect that some 22 million people lost 
their jobs in the Asian crisis (The Economist, 17 April 2004, p. 76).  
17 See UNCTAD 1997. 
18 Feldstein and Herioka 1980.  
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Finally, the WTO system opens up the possibility of enmeshing the trade system into the investment 
and other subsystems in the application of trade law. Developing countries have long signalled their 
opposition to applying trade sanctions in disputes involving non-trade issues. By invoking the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanisms in non-trade disputes, the strong trading countries can exploit their 
trade dissuasion power (the trade capacity and the associated value of trade concessions) all across the 
issues; and that would create unexpected problems for those who negotiated the WTO law in good 
faith within the strict confines of the trading system.  
 
D.  The interfacing of the national and international orders 
 
The establishment of the WTO revived sharply the old disputes regarding where lie the demarcation 
lines between the national and international domains and how they should interface. The IMF 
provided an early example of this tension but the WTO has escalated the debate. Its rules and 
obligations, and indeed the new international trade law – on the reasoning that some domestic policies 
have international consequences – step into areas of policy that where located squarely in national 
domains. Prime examples are to be found in industrial policies and agricultural subsidies, both of 
which violate the new WTO rules. To be sure, the essential purpose of industrial policies is to give 
added impetus to economic development; and of agricultural policies to impart balance to the use of 
the environment and to preserve certain modes of living and traditions. However, both policies are 
found contrary to international order because they violate the international principle of an even-
playing field. In many countries, wide segments of society do not accept this encroachment upon the 
national sphere and place greater value on the accomplishment of the above-mentioned goals than on 
the rules and efficacy of the international system. Moreover, a certain historical duplicity is assessed 
upon the advocates of liberal trade in that many of them – Japan, the United States, the European 
countries and the Republic of Korea to cite some examples – have in the past practised and benefited 
from these same currently forbidden policies. 
 
In the case of the IMF, certain conditionality targets such as ceilings on debt and money supply and 
the size of public budget are seen to be contrary to the sovereign right of governance and the self 
determination of domestic affaires; governments accept them more by the pressures of need than by 
any conviction about their merits. The same is even more egregious in the IMF surveillance and 
conditionality provisions regarding countries that need Fund resources. For example, the recent Fund 
packages for Turkey and for Argentina get into budgets, pension reforms, privatizations, financial 
domestic regulations and social security – areas that countries not in need for IMF support would 
strictly keep under their sovereign prerogatives. It is clear that there are no ready or agreed criteria as 
to where the demarcation lines should be, since what might be required by international concerns is 
sometimes of a predominantly domestic nature and what might be done domestically could have large 
international implications. Nor could one make an easy trade off between the national interest and 
those of the international order because the national benefits are felt directly while the international 
ones are often felt indirectly.  
 
 
II. THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 
 
It can be argued that the international monetary and financial systems are the main driving force of 
globalization. That is manifest in the advanced degree of integration of the financial markets and the 
scale to which the global economy exhibits the financial and monetary interdependence of economies. 
It is evident that the free movement of capital affecting exchange rates and in the process, unsettling  
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financial conditions and economic policies, lead to boom and bust conditions and currency gyrations 
in most economies. It is also evident that in a global economy, the variation of economic policies and 
financial conditions in the major countries spill over into the small countries and overwhelm their 
small economies. Yet, the prevailing international monetary system was designed for the conditions of 
the world economy prior to the arrival of globalization.  
 
The outstanding features of the two organizations established at Bretton Woods in 1944, namely the 
IMF and the IBRD and their underlying systems, can be succinctly described. The International 
Monetary System (IMS) was to have no resources of its own, contrary to the original proposals of 
Keynes and the British Treasury. It was instead based on national quotas negotiated with members 
upon entry, which constitute the key to resource contributions and to decision making as well as to 
access to the financial facilities. The IMF was to be essentially concerned with the area of current 
account adjustment and current account flows, though Article IV of the Articles of Agreement, 
provided that one of its main purposes was establishing a framework for capital exchange among 
members. The exchange rate system was to be initially fixed, but eventually adjustable. The United 
States dollar was put at the centre of the international reserve system, to be later on complemented by 
other key currencies. 
 
The IBRD evolved from a post-war reconstruction agency for post-war Europe, as the name says, to a 
development funding institution called the World Bank, essentially concerned with developing 
countries. Interestingly, it was not endowed with much authority in the governance of the global 
financial system. Once again, the quota system was enshrined at the centre of its resources, its 
operations and its governance. 
 
This system, repeatedly patched up here and there, has survived to the present day without a 
fundamental change in its character. To be sure, there has been many facilities added and subtracted, 
the resource pool has increased 12-fold, the membership more than tripled, the conditionality evolved, 
but still the system often has no overall cohesiveness and its various members have contradictory 
expectations of it. 
 
In 1972–1974, a window of opportunity opened up to revamp the system in order to bring it up to date 
and render it consistent with the evolution of capital markets, the exchange rate experience, the 
development issues and the evolution of international trade. This however, failed again to secure 
consensus agreement, with the United States and Germany objecting to different sets of 
recommendations made by the Committee of Twenty (C20). 
 
The reform issue was subsequently put on the back burner for more than a decade. The system has had 
two amendments to the Articles of Agreements: to create the SDRs as the system currency and unit of 
account in 1968 and to legalize ex post facto floating in 1978. In the wake of the Latin American and 
the Asian crises of 1997, many authorities, and even some states, called for a new architecture of the 
system more suitable to the global economic conditions. Many worthwhile ideas have been put 
forward since 1972, and particularly after 1997. However, despite all that has been said about the 
inadequacy of the old system under the new global conditions, there has been no official agreement on 
substantial reforms. 
 
The outstanding issues in this area can be listed under the following headings: (a) the governance and 
regulation of the capital and monetary flows; (b) the management of financial crisis and the function 
of the bank of last resort; (c) the foreign exchange system; and (d) the reform of the IMF. In the  
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limited scope of this paper it is hardly possible to cover in depth all these issues. Nevertheless, an 
attempt will be made to highlight the important and interconnected aspects of each of them. 
 
A.  The governance and regulation of financial flows 
 
The Bretton Woods system provided no governance for international financial flows. Although 
Keynes was quite keen on the topic, the other conferees did not seem in 1944 to be much concerned 
about it. However, the achievement of capital account convertibility in the advanced countries as of 
1959 (some four years after realizing current account equilibrium) and the subsequent development of 
capital markets in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, propelled this issue to the fore. In the wake of the 
Asian crisis in 1997, and the demonstrated globalization of financial markets, it could no longer be 
ignored.  
 
The Articles of Agreements of the IMF contained disparate references to financial flows in Articles IV 
and VI. As indicated above, Article IV made the free exchange of finance among member states a 
fundamental objective of the IMF. Article VI provides permissibility of capital controls as long as they 
do not impede or restrict payments made for the current account transactions (the balance of trade and 
unilateral transfers). It also disallows the use of the resources of the Fund to support large capital 
outflows. 
 
The concern with the growth of financial instability impelled the G7 (the group of seven major 
industrial countries) in February 1999 to establish the “Financial Stability Forum” with the aim of 
promoting international financial stability through improved exchange of information, cooperation 
with respect to financial supervision and surveillance, and streamlining standards and norms in the 
various participant countries. Naturally, this work cannot be confined to financial flows and the 
financial institutions, as it has direct implications with respect to macroeconomic policies, the various 
standards of the financial system and its judicial framework. 
 
In each of the various areas, a key standard was established with a lead institution responsible for 
developing the necessary codes, rules, norms, and standards. Consequently, the BIS has over the last 
decade been the forum in which officials from the participating countries and international 
organizations, without the presence of private sector agents, have concluded numerous agreements 
aiming at establishing cooperative modalities for systematically collecting information on capital and 
monetary flows and disseminating them to members and the public. The Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) has reached numerous agreements on codes of behavior such as the code of “Good 
Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies”, and the same for transparency in fiscal 
policy. It reached agreements on financial regulation and supervision such as “The Core Principles of 
Effective Banking Supervision” and those of security and insurance. It also agreed on regulation 
standards for insolvency, for corporate governance, for auditing and accounting and principles to deal 
with money laundering. It also agreed to rules and procedures for the treatment of important financial 
concepts such as risk and exposure as well as setting up modalities of cooperation among officials of 
member states.
19 An important part of what was achieved is the collection of data and the 
establishment of a shared database. 
 
Unfortunately, the private sector was not involved directly in devising the new rules and principles. 
Nor was it asked to share any responsibility. Further, no modalities were agreed upon to secure its 
                                                      
19 For a detailed discussion and analysis see Cornford 2000 and 2001.   
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continuous involvement in financial governance, let alone setting up a non-voluntary code of 
investors’ behavior. 
 
All of this work, with all its due importance, amounted in effect to organizing in the source countries 
the supervision of their institutions and setting up financial regulations and behavior standards for their 
institutions. Naturally, global financial governance involves conduct in crises, obligations on the 
source authorities as well as the recipient country authorities and above all, setting up proper models 
of conduct and codes of standards for private investors. But this was not to be, as the private sector 
participation remained strictly voluntary. 
 
As noted earlier, the increased globalization of the world economy and the evolved integration of 
financial markets have resulted in the enormous increase in cross-border financial flows, with a 
concomitant increase in financial instability and frequent eruptions of financial and currency crises. 
No doubt the purpose of the new codes and standards is to increase financial stability and prevent, or 
at least, forewarn of impending crises. The implicit logic of this work is that a unified system and 
symmetrical rules would create systemic checks and controls.  
 
This work has added significantly to the literature and helped to identify many of the systemic issues 
that have not been actively explored since the reform exercise of the Committee of Twenty (C20) in 
1972–1974. However, the reluctance of a major country to take private financial flows into the official 
public system and accept sharing control with others over private financial participants forestalled 
moving these discussions outside the BIS into the IMS framework. 
 
In this context, several other proposals have been put forward to set up a system authority to carry out 
and enforce financial governance since the 1980s. Some proposals suggest the creation of a worldwide 
supervisory and regulatory authority, the “World Financial Authority”, to regulate and supervise all 
institutions and markets.
20 Another variant more concerned with system issues and policies, developed 
proposals to establish a super agency over all the relevant international organizations to be responsible 
for the whole system: its policies, regulations, supervision and crisis management. Many specialists, 
including this author, have published proposals in this genre.
21 Another set of proposals aimed at 




All these proposals share the aim of establishing a global authority with a global perspective and 
enforceable authority to deal with the application of regulations, codes of behavior, methods of 
controls and rules of functioning on radically different basis than the piecemeal, patchy approach of 
the present institutions. It is argued that the globalization of the world economy now calls for such an 
approach. 
 
The test of the BIS forum achievements arrived with the eruption of the Asian crisis. Unfortunately, 
the system failed to anticipate the crisis. Worst still, it showed that despite the evident transparency of 
macro policies in the stricken countries and their appropriateness as far as the IMF prescriptions go, 
the crises were not prevented. 
 
                                                      
20 Eatwell and Taylor 2000. 
21 Sakbani 1985, pp. 149–193.  
22 Soros 1997 and 1998.   
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In application, it turned out that the new and old system measures and rules were asymmetrical as 
regards the source countries and the recipient ones. Most of what was put in place in the crises threw 
the burden on the recipients by imposing duties, restrictions on action and by providing sanctions and 
incentives for particular choices of policies. There were no concomitant treatment on the same basis of 
the institutions and the investors in the source countries. Surely the openness to the external world 
implied by the rules of the monetary system would mean that the monetary policies of the source 
countries and their financial conditions will inevitably spill into the recipient ones. Yet, there is no 
built-in reach to the source country policies unless they need the IMF. Moreover, while the advanced 
countries can, on account of the size and strength of their economies, absorb mutual inconsistencies in 
their respective policies, such inconsistencies unsettle the recipient economies, being small and 
underdeveloped.  
 
Another problem concerns the treatment of the private sector. Since private investors and speculators 
in the source countries are responsible for the bulk of the financial flows, the voluntary character of 
the application of the established rules and codes to them stands in stark contrast to the summons to 
obey with consequent sanctions addressed to the recipient and their private concerns. A code of 
behavior for investors would be an enormous development. However, there are several objections to 
such a binding code. The first argues that it is exceedingly difficult to enforce it. The second is an 
efficiency argument about the distortion of allocation of international investment funds in the case of 
involuntary controls. The third concerns the deterrence to capital movements it might bring about, in 
particular, inflows to the poorer countries. The fourth is the desirability of avoiding bureaucratic 
decision making and conflict of jurisdictions in case of crisis. The counter arguments are familiar from 
the work of the BIS and the literature on capital controls and the Tobin tax.
23 Briefly, it is argued that 
feasibility is an open empirical question; that the efficiency argument assumes that a code-free system 
is optimal and is already in place and that the fear of bureaucratic conflicts is exaggerated.  
 
On balance a universal code applied by all and enforced by an impartial international authority such as 
the IMF should be feasible. It should have minimal rules and be invoked only when there is a system 
risk. Models of such a code have been under study and development in the BIS and the Financial 
Stability Forum over the last five years.
24 It would seem that the basic contribution of such a code lies, 
besides the profit motive, in setting a reference model for voluntary investor behavior. 
 
Upon examining these rules, codes and standards, one cannot escape the impression of an implacable 
liberal character. There is insistence on openness under all circumstances and on currency 
convertibility at all times. The recipient countries are admonished if they violate the tenets of the 
system but the source countries whose policies are at least partially responsible for the problems are 
not addressed. It is difficult not to conclude that the diagnosis of the problems and the remedies are 
lopsided; often they compensate for inefficacy by increasing restrictions. The highly audible censure 
voiced out in respect of Malaysia when, contrary to the Fund’s prescriptions, it abandoned temporarily 
unrestricted openness and convertibility and imposed temporary capital controls, cuts a poor figure of 
the open-mindedness of the prevailing financial governance. Finally, there is a serious concern that all 
these regulations and rules are gradually, but surely seeping into IMF conditionality.  
 
                                                      
23 Schmidt 2000, Akira et al. 2000, Kaplan and Rodrik 2001. 
24 On investor’s code of behavior, see, Financial Stability Forum, Compendium of Standards, in 
http://www.fsforum.org and BIS 2005.  
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B.  The management of financial crises: the bank of last resort 
 
This topic is intimately related to that of the International Reserve System. Without a reserve system 
which has its base in the Fund, any arrangement will ultimately depend on the political decisions of 
the dominant Fund members in accepting or not to fulfil this function. In the event, this function is 
exercised on a case-by-case basis. In other words, it is not an established and regular system function. 
And it will not be a system function until and perhaps unless the IMF has the capacity, like any 
national monetary authority, to initiate action on its own with its own resources in its capacity as the 
custodian of the international monetary and financial systems. For this reason the first amendment to 
the Articles of Agreement in 1968 introduced the SDRs as the base of the system. However, despite 
much improvement in their characteristics and much extension in their use within the Fund, SDRs 
have remained a mere 2 per cent fraction of international reserves. The last time one heard of the 
SDRs was in 1994 when M. Camdessus, the Managing Director of the Fund then, proposed a third 
issue of the SDRs destined primarily to the newly joint Eastern European countries. That proposal was 
scuttled by the developing countries who objected to the preferential treatment accorded to the new 
members. Politically speaking, the issue remains on the back burner and for the time being, there seem 
to be no advocates.  
 
From inception, the IMF was created without resources of its own. Even prior to the Bretton Woods, 
the Keynes’ vision of an autonomously financed Union with flexible and discretionary resource base 
was abandoned in view of opposition by the United States. In its place, the United States concept, 
articulated by Under-Secretary Harry Dexter White, was to enshrine an institution based on a resource 
pool contributed and controlled by the countries with majority quotas. Consequently, the IMF resource 
base and its modalities of decision making have been unsuited for this role from inception. Thus, the 
new global conditions in financial and currency markets have thrust the institution into areas for which 
it has no adequate resource base independent of the political decisions of its major members. 
Experience has shown these countries to be willing to act only on case-by-case basis with full regard 
to their political links to the countries involved. 
 
Nonetheless, the frequent occurrence of financial crises and the fact that the IMF is the only institution 
with a semblance of a supranational central bank have brought up this topic with a surprising vigour. 
In recent years, several proposals have been formulated to deal with this lacuna, the most ambitious of 
which is the proposal of the Meltzer Commission set up by the United States Congress. There are also 
a host of published contributions to make a case for this role.
25  
 
There are a number of issues to be pointed out in this context: some political, some institutional and 
some technical. The lender of last resort role requires not only resources, but enforceable control on all 
countries as well. It is doubtful that an international consensus on granting an international institution 
such powers will emerge in the near future. The institutional issues involve a radical transformation of 
the IMF functions and its concept of international adjustment. Very specifically, the IMF has to adopt 
a global vision of the pattern of adjustment of the current accounts, i.e. which countries have to adjust 
and what size deficits (or surpluses) can the system tolerate. This cannot, of course, be isolated from a 
global perspective of the positions of the capital accounts and their evolution. This realization has led 
the major counties, in particular the United States, to propose moving the Fund into the capital account 
area. In fact, the Meltzer Commission suggests substituting a capital account role for the present 
practice of emphasizing the current account. 
                                                      
25 Fischer 1999.   
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The other institutional matter is to revamp the surveillance function so as to apply it to all countries 
whether they are in need or not of Fund resources. The technical issues concern the fashioning of an 
operational model for contra-cyclical policy and its operational procedures. Other technical questions 
concern measuring the degree of country risk, placing limit on the size of a country loan in terms of 
some valid yard stick such as the GDP and the conditionality to be applied and last but not least, the 
obligations of the private sector if it is involved. 
 
Under the pressure of circumstances, the IMF has become involved in handling financial crises in the 
last decade. The cost of crises is such that the systemic dangers of losses of 9–20 per cent of the GDP 
of the affected countries could not be ignored. Nevertheless, the emphasis has been on rescue 
operations rather than on preventive ex ante action. Towards this end, two facilities were established: 
the Supplementary Reserve Facility and the Contingency Reserve Facility. The first is to help 
countries already in crises while the second, which did not endure, is to prevent or to anticipate them. 
 
The crises in Asia and in Latin America have informed our judgement of their salient features and 
provided examples of the kind of policy packages on offer in the system. The crises were of two 
varieties: financial and debt payment. In order of magnitude, the former are much more important than 
the latter even though they are less frequent. Except for the asymmetrical emphasis on the debtors and 
the failure to involve the private sector on non-voluntary basis and the absence of standstills, the rules 
of debt working out call for minor changes. In this context, note ought to be taken of the proposal on 
working out the debt crises made by UNCTAD in 1986 and brought up again in the UNCTAD 1998 
Trade and Development Report. It involves imposing a standstill and the application of procedures 
similar to those in Chapter 11 of the United States code, in restructuring and recapitalizing, under 
proper supervisory authority, illiquid firms. It is a proposal which still merit attention today. The 
situation, however, is quite different in financial crises. 
 
The financial crises in Asia and Latin America have some common features and similar sequences. 
They were predominantly crises in the financial system. In the majority of cases in Asia, there was no 
macroeconomic policy mismanagement signalled by the Fund in its prior surveillance consultations 
with the members. Typically, there was a malfunctioning domestic financial system interacting with 
the typical behavior of the open international financial system. Usually, the start is ignited by banks 
carrying on their books a great deal of large assets that are non-performing. This leads in short order to 
failure of the banks to cope with servicing liabilities denominated in foreign exchange. Swiftly, a 
currency crisis explodes and the balance sheets of the banks and other institutions suffer severe 
deterioration in their domestic currency net worth. The swift and simultaneous reaction of creditors to 
these developments ushers in a country balance of payments crisis and usually requires severe 
adjustment. The crisis soon propagates into all sectors of the economy and spills over into other 
countries by, inter alia, altering the risk perception of international investors. The international official 
system then becomes involved to stem possible systemic risk. As a result, rescue packages would be 
negotiated with the stricken countries. These seem to have some important common features. 
 
It is fair to say there have been some important shortcomings to the rescue packages. The first is that a 
compulsory role for the private sector is usually not there: creditors are invited to participate 
voluntarily in implementing the package. Clearly, such participation is a cardinal requirement 
especially when large private debt sums or significant foreign owned liabilities are involved. The 
second has been the one-sided emphasis placed on the stricken countries and not equally on the major 
countries whose economic policies and conditions are also responsible in part for the crises. This 
creditor bias is rather incongruous; that given the degree of integration of international capital markets  
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the packages overlooked the monetary and exchange rates policies of the major countries and the 
financial developments in their economies. These major countries affect international interest rates, 
international risk perception and international flows of capital and shape the emergent pattern of 
adjustment of the balance of payments. It is to be recalled that the major countries are also more 
capable because of the size of their economies, than the typical stricken countries, of bearing the cost 
of crisis adjustment.  
 
The third problem has been the liberal model prescriptions and the resulting selective official 
approbation. The example cited above, of censoring and criticising Malaysia which made one of the 
most successful recoveries for its non-adherence to the liberal one-prescription-fits-all philosophy as it 
suspended temporary cross-border capital flows, is a case in point. In this context, it is in good order to 
recall the disastrous consequences reaped by Mexico after its full-scale and non-graduated 
liberalization of its financial system. The massive movement of financial flows across the border 
threw the country on the ropes.
26 Fourth, in the crises management of Latin America and Asia, the 
stricken countries sought unlimited support, and, in the event, the IMF seems to have granted that. 
Since the private sector would be a major beneficiary of the support money, such unlimited support 
raises the question of moral hazard and unfairness in distributing the burden. More specifically, unless 
the private sector accepts to share in the cost of the rescue, unlimited support furnishes debtors with 
the capacity to continue servicing their debt without demanding a quid pro quo from creditors who 
therefore might get away without paying for the mistakes they made. By contrast the taxpayers in the 
rescued countries will end up paying the ultimate bill. In addition there are questions of moral hazard 
and system fairness with regard to countries that have not needed help in managing their affaires. 
There is therefore a manifest need to bar or at least limit creditors’ access to IMF resources, except as 
a part of a debtor-creditor shared package.  
 
The rescue packages have had some prescriptions that, in the light of the crises developments, are in 
need of revision. Among such prescriptions are: hiking, often by several points to double digit order, 
the domestic interest rates; the absence of short term capital account restrictions in general and the 
frequent absence of standstills in paying the debtors. The Asian crisis revealed the large size of the 
foreign exchange risk that faced the mal-performing financial system. It also showed a large exposure 
to interest rates risk and various manifestations of liquidity risk. 
 
Examining the micro and macro consequences of the measures recommended would be instructive. 
For one thing, the unrestricted servicing of debt and other liabilities by the indebted financial 
institutions sits badly with the short term illiquid status of the rest of their balance sheets. For another, 
dramatic increases in interest rates, damaging to the macroeconomic performance in the first place, 
increase greatly the interest rate risk of debt and other fixed income securities and inflicts large capital 
losses on the balance sheet of banks and other financial institutions of the debtors. It should be recalled 
that financial institutions in the stricken countries do two types of transformations: maturity 
transformation and a unit of account one. The dramatic deterioration of the exchange rate increases by 
the same proportion the servicing of liabilities in domestic currency terms. Simultaneously, the 
maturity transformation results in duration gaps between assets and liabilities. Given such wide 
                                                      
26 Liberalization in Mexico resulted in severe pressure on the Peso which engendered large capital outflows. To 
stem the currency crises, short term instruments called “tesobonos” were issued to raise funds for repaying the 
short term debt. But these were to be repaid in United States dollars. As the Peso slid down, the domestic 
currency value of these mounted and Mexican reserves declined to only $6 billion in 1995, far bellow the $30 
billion due debt repayments in the year. President Clinton in his autobiography describes vividly the unfolding of 
the crisis and the United States response to it (Clinton 2004).   
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duration gaps, the hiking of interest rates inflicts a net capital loss on the asset side. The result is 
severe deterioration in banks balance sheet that might wipe out their net worth. 
 
This problem has recently attracted a good deal of attention. For example, Barry Eichengreen of 
Berkley has just published a proposal to float bonds denominated in a synthetic unit of account based 
on a basket of developing country currencies for choosy investors unwilling to invest except in bonds 
or securities denominated in key currencies. The effective exchange rate of such bonds is more stable 
than individual currencies. These bonds would further entice the creditor banks to carry them for 
reducing their exposure to country risk. He calculated that the increased premiums to be paid would be 
a small fraction of the cost of the Asian crises.
27 
 
There are also systemic questions which have not received due attention. These concern the criteria by 
which to judge whether a country crisis constitutes a systemic risk or not. Most likely, the size of the 
economy, the size of the debt, if that is the problem, or the probability of contagion to others, will all 
have to be factored in choosing the criteria. Thus a two-tier system would be created: one for the big 
countries and one for the small and less important ones. It would not be a small political matter to 
secure the cooperation and the political approval of the small countries in such an international effort. 
 
C.  The foreign exchange system 
 
The foreign exchange system used to be one of two major topics of discussion regarding the IMS in 
the 1960s; the other was the international reserve system. These discussions emphasized the choice of 
regimes – fixed or floating. After the breakdown of the old Bretton Woods system of fixed but flexible 
rates in August 1971 there was no official willingness to suggest radical changes in the prevailing 
system The first Smithsonian agreement of December 1971 amounted to tinkering with the old 
parities, while the second Smithsonian in 1972 was a surrender to reality, as major currencies started 
floating against each other in March 1973. In 1978, the agreement embodied in the second amendment 
to the Articles of Agreement of Jamaica, aimed ex post facto at legalizing the status quo. The revision 
of Article IV on surveillance laid such vague guidelines as to amount to generalities. There was no 
statement of obligations, no standards to judge misalignments and no authority to enforce action on 
countries that are not in need for IMF resources.
28 It was left to macroeconomic policies to carry the 
burden of arriving at orderly conditions.  
 
Most unexpectedly, the C20 did not fare much better; it recommended the same old system but with a 
new parity grid and some guidelines and quantitative indicators for adjustment. The failure of the C20 
to come up with a solution is symptomatic of the underlying problem; to wit, the problem of the 
misalignment of the major currencies as a result of the underlying mutually incoherent, more 
diplomatically, mutually inconsistent macroeconomic policies. 
 
Under the circumstances, the minor developing country currencies, more than half of which are tied to 
one of the three main currencies, suffer instabilities resulting form the mutual incoherence of the pegs. 
The solution on offer by the IMF New Article IV is to lay adjustment on the minor country 
macroeconomic policies, leaving outside the scope of surveillance, the macroeconomic policies of the 
major countries and their resultant exchange rates. Thus, the gyrations in the exchange rates of the 
major currencies have not made possible the realization of orderly conditions, the term of New   
                                                      
27 See a summary of Barry Eichengreen’s proposal in The Economist, 17 April 2004. 
28 The late Robert Triffin had similar views on Jamaica (Triffin 1976).  
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Article IV, and has neither saved reserves nor insulated the various economies as hoped by the 
advocates of floating. 
 
The instability of real exchange rates, defined by any statistical measure of volatility, has increased 
under floating, thereby spilling over into developing countries, and in the event, unsettling their 
macroeconomic and financial conditions.
29 The IMF estimates that more than half of the volatility of 
developing country exchange rates is explained by the volatility of the real exchange rates of the G3 
countries, i.e., the dollar, the yen and the Euro. It also holds that “the greater volatility of real 
exchange rates has been associated with greater real effective exchange rates misalignment”.
30 
 
During the past thirty years, the major currency countries undertook only two coordinated 
interventions following the Plaza Accord of 1985, and the Louvre Accord of 1987. In all other 
instances, where volatility aroused concerns, the major countries refused to intervene on the argument 
that intervention does not resolve the fundamental problems and that the markets are better at deciding 
the parities. This is an argument that rejects dealing with the manifestations of the symptoms but says 
nothing about how and when it will deal with the problem. 
 
In 2003, almost half of the emerging market economies used an intermediate peg system, i.e., one of 
pegged but adjustable rates. According to the former chief economist of the Fund,
31 this is a decline 
from the level of more than two-thirds in 1991. Simultaneously, the proportion of countries using a 
hard peg (a fixed peg with narrow limits), or free-floating regimes has risen to 58 per cent.
32 It is not 
difficult to see the reason for this shift: the floating of major currencies unsettles the financial 
conditions of the small economies; it creates boom and bust gyrations and overshooting of their 
exchange rates. Against such a backdrop, the Meltzer Commission, created by the United States 
Congress, recommended that the Fund should encourage emerging economies to adopt either a full 
float or a rigid Currency Board (CB) regime. Views along with the lines of the Meltzer Commission 
were articulated by Lawrence Summers, the former United States Secretary of the Treasury, in the 
Bank-Fund annual meetings of 2001.
33 However, these two corner or polar solutions are not workable 
and, for the reasons mentioned below, might be quite harmful to many emerging economies. It would 
be quite useful to concentrate on developing intermediate solutions (currency pegs with wide and 
changeable margins) together with securing the conditions for their workability. 
 
The proposals of reform in this area are a market basket variety of currency bands and intervention 
limits around them together with guidelines of misalignment, such as price movements, and 
quantitative triggers of action.
34 There are also some old but still valid proposals aiming at a system 
solution that can be considered politically feasible; the Ethier-Bloomfield reference rate proposal 
comes to mind in this respect.
35 What is essentially required is to have the IMF refashion its 
surveillance function so as to pass over the validity of the exchange rate of countries. That requires 
calculating fundamental equilibrium exchange rates and establishing wide margins around them. This 
is essential after the experiences of France, Denmark, Italy and the United Kingdom in the European 
Monetary System (EMS). Several policy instruments can be used to track these rates. Among such 
instruments are: sterilized intervention, where assets are not perfect substitutes, temporary capital 
                                                      
29 Williamson 1983, 5:11–22 and 1979, Chapter 8; IMF 2003a, p. 94. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Fischer 2001. 
32 Ibid., Figure 2. 
33 Summers 2000. 
34 The proposal by Ethier and Bloomfield – the Reference Rates is still current (Ethier and  Bloomfield 1975). 
See also the discussion in Williamson 1979, Chapter 8 - The Future. 
35 UNCTAD 1987.  
 
19
controls and in the longer term, interest rates and monetary policy.
36 Naturally, an important 
requirement is to have an anchor either in the form of exchange rate or another quantitative policy 
anchor. 
 
There have been in practice three types of solution: the Currency Boards (CB) solutions followed by 
Argentina and others, the regional solution following the example of the European Union, and the 
intermediate solution, advocated here and by, inter alia, John Williamson.
37 The CB solution is a short 
term way out for countries with credibility problems and a history of inflation. As the Argentine 
example shows, it leads in time to overvaluation and consequently to a balance of payments problem. 
It also exposes the pegging country to the external shocks hitting the country of the chosen peg 
without having monetary policy tools for dealing with them. 
 
The European Union solution is promising, but requires economic policy convergence and a high 
degree of intra-zone openness in trade, capital and labour movement. Perhaps more important, it needs 
the political will to do it – a solution difficult to marshal in the absence of some specific political or 
economic payoffs. In Southeast Asia and the Andean group in Latin America, interest has been 
expressed in regional solutions modelled on the European experience.
38 However, no concrete actions 
have been taken to push such an exercise forward in Asia, and the proposal to establish the Andean 
Peso has not found common acceptance. The intermediate or middle solution is worth exploring; it 
does not seem that its political feasibility is untenable. 
 
The system is therefore slated to continue placing the burden of adjustment on the policies and 
exchange rates of the minor countries leaving the three major peg currencies free to move against each 
other in any and whatever way it comes. 
 
D.  The reform of the IMF 
 
There are three main issues in this area: (1) governance of the IMF; (2) the surveillance and 
conditionality and the reserve system together with the function of the bank of last resort. This paper 
has already dealt with the last topic above. 
 
1.  Governance of the IMF 
 
The Fund governance has been a contentious issue between the developing and developed countries 
since the mid-1950s.
39 The familiar argument of the former is that the quota system is not fair as a key 
for decision making and access to resources. The response of the latter is that it is only normal and fair 
that each country’s share in decision making be commensurate with its contribution to the Fund 
resources. Between these symmetrically reasoned positions, there is room for two considerations. 
                                                      
36 Many economists doubt the financial efficiency and the efficacy of temporary capital controls unless they are 
pervasive and isolate the economy. Others doubt any effect of intervention. Some economists hold that 
calculating fundamental equilibrium exchange rates is both difficult and unreliable. While it is true that 
intervention cannot correct fundamental problems, it can, in the short run and when assets are not perfect 
substitutes, have effects, thereby giving some time for policy. This author does not share the view that 
calculating the equilibrium rates is that difficult and it should be stressed that any rates will have to be changed 
in time. What is difficult politically is for the big countries, in particular the United States, to accept any 
surveillance by the IMF over their economic policies. It is hard to imagine the United States accepting any 
approbation of its current fiscal policy. 
37 Williamson, op cit. 1983, pp. 63–72. 
38 Recently, Asian countries in the ASEAN scene have expressed desire to establish a regional currency model 
inspired by the success of the European Monetary System. No concrete measures have yet been taken.  
39 See various issues of UNCTAD Trade and Development Report, especially 1986.  
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First, quotas can still be the key to fair decision power if each country is given a common minimum 
weight plus votes proportional to the size of its quota. This is like the system of bi-chamber 
representation in, say, the United States, whose purpose is to protect the small states against the 
majority dominance of the big ones. Second, the negotiated nature of the quota both initially and when 
revised makes it somewhat more of a political question than one of fairness. 
 
There are, in my judgement, limits to this debate. The economic system is one in which states are not 
equal, some are certainly more economically important than others even though they all have “equal” 
political sovereignty. This holds in fact when it comes to the contribution of member states to the 
system. It also holds in economic theory in analysing big economy influence over international 
adjustment. The economic conditions and policies of the major countries fundamentally affect the 
international economy. Similarly, the effects of global economic changes are more important for the 
big economies. It is uncontroversial to assert that a decision by the IMF requires more the assent and 
active cooperation of the large economy countries than the small ones. Economic analysis explicitly 
distinguishes between large and small economies when it comes to the international influence of their 
macroeconomic policies. 
 
There is political economy validity to the distinction made between the model of representative and 
that of participatory democracy.
40 The constituency system of the IMF enlists under the model of 
representative democracy. In international affairs, representative democracy is not less valid, given its 
conditions, than participatory democracy. By adopting the bi-chamber type of weights, one can narrow 
but not eliminate the distance between the two. As a matter of wise pragmatism on the part of 
developing countries, they should not contest the preponderance of the major industrial countries in 
the IMF, not just because that reflects the facts of the world, but as a matter of political strategy on 
their part to secure their participation in the system and their acceptance of the resultant restrictions on 
their actions. In return, the industrial developed countries gain system legitimacy. The value of this 
system legitimacy has been amply demonstrated by the foreign policy of the United States from World 
War II until recently. The United States has used the international system legitimacy to co-opt others 
to participate along their side in actions, organizations and international rules which serve their 
interests. A reformed and strengthened international system is largely in the interest of the weak 
members; if it comes to have sufficient resources and sensible authority, it will serve the interest of its 
small members relatively more than the large ones. 
 
The developing countries have created two institutional modalities to strengthen their influence on the 
IMF: the Group of Twenty Four and the Development Committee. The G24 was established more than 
three decades ago by the Group of 77, which had founded the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development. It has had a good working program supported by UNCTAD and other international 
secretariats as well as by the service of independent experts of distinction. It is fair to say that it has 
had beneficial influence on the IMF and has, to certain extent, served the interests of developing 
countries. However, the G24 has shown a degree of institutional acculturation to the IMF and the 
Bank, as gleaned from the different tonality of its views regarding the operations of these Washington 
institutions than what is heard usually from the developing country representatives in other fora. The 
criticism of the Fund by the representatives of the developing countries in other fora has always had 
sharper and more accented tones than any thing voiced by the G24. Perhaps it would be worthwhile 
for the G24 to invite to some of its meetings representatives of developing countries active on 
monetary and financial issues in other fora to enrich its deliberations and contribute to its work. 
                                                      
40 Sakbani 1985, Part II.  
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The Development Committee was established in the Jamaica meeting of 1976 and became functional 
in 1978. The purpose was to bring into the Bretton Woods institutions an increased emphasis on the 
development dimension of their work. The Committee meets semi-annually at the time of the IMF 
meetings, and is attended by representatives of developing countries and relevant international 
organizations. At the close of the meeting, it issues a public communiqué summarizing its 
deliberations and conclusions. The Committee serves essentially the role of a public forum for moral 
suasion. It has no means to make a daily input to the IMF processes and its decision making. However, 
the existence of the Committee has deflected legitimate possible criticism from developing countries 
and served, perhaps unwittingly, to distance and undermine contributions by other organizations 
primarily concerned with development and possessive of operational capabilities that can be deployed 
assiduously in the pursuit of the work of the IMF. After more than 26 years of operation, developing 
countries ought to take stock of the results, and if need be, devise ways and means to revitalize and 
refashion the modalities of this forum 
 
One more political reform deserves attention. Some big members, in particular the United States, have 
not hid their willingness to use the IMF as a tool of their foreign policy. United States officials are on 
record reiterating that they will help some countries they consider friendly obtaining access to the 
resources of the IMF, and impede countries they deem unfriendly, or on some black list, from access 
to its resources. This might seem repugnant to earnest souls, but is a part of world real politique. 
Indeed, if one were to run a correlation between the countries that have gotten big help from the IMF 
over the years and their degree of friendliness to the United States, the coefficient of correlation would 
certainly be quite high. There is no reform that can eliminate this political bias. But an IMF in charge 
of its resources and endowed with global authority and mission provided for in its agreement, would 
undoubtedly go some way towards minimizing this bias. 
 
2. Surveillance  and  conditionality 
 
Conditionality was developed by the IMF in the early 1950s to ensure the paying back of members’ 
purchases, thereby preserving the revolving character of its resources. Some time later, in the 1960s 
and 1970s, a paternalistic aspect to conditionality came into evidence as the IMF meant to guide the 
countries under its adjustment programs towards what it regarded the correct path to equilibrium using 
the correct model.
41 In the 1980s as the debt crisis erupted in Mexico, and later on in other indebted 
countries, conditionality expanded beyond current account problems to cover many aspects of 
financial accounts and to bear on disparate aspects of domestic economic policies. The debt crisis 
brought domestic financial systems and policies under the purview of conditionality. At the behest of 
the dominant members, policy reform emerged into the forefront at the close of the 1980s and 
beginning of the 1990s. The Fund acting in coordination with the World Bank began to lay restrictions 
and performance clauses on macro and micro economic policies and the two institutions divided the 
enforcement work among themselves. By the 1990s, the avowed intent and priority of conditionality 
was placed on policy and structural reforms and new facilities were created to finance such programs. 
The programs suggested were all conceived within a liberal model in whose validity in all cases, the 
IMF has accentuated its conviction.
42  
 
The protestations of many member states and qualified experts against this cumulative accretion of 
conditionality prompted the International Monetary and Financial Committee (the Interim Committee) 
to call in 2001 on the Executive Board to refocus the conditionality on the most essential issues. So 
                                                      
41 For detailed exposition of the IMF programmes and conditionality, see Williamson 1982. 
42 See Rodrik 1999.  
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far, there is no indication of how far this refocusing has gone. At any rate, it has not yet resulted in 
noticeable changes in conditionality practices. As a matter of fact, the recent packages for Turkey and 
Argentina have delved into the areas of trade, social security, privatization and pension funds reform, 
which are in the remit of other organizations and lie in the traditional chasse gardé of sovereign 
matters. 
 
As to the surveillance of exchange rates, it was argued above that the IMF has not covered the 
exchange rate policies of the major currency countries, thereby omitting one of the principal causes of 
disorderly conditions of developing country exchange rates. Nor has the Fund extended its 
surveillance remit to the macroeconomic policies of the major countries to assure that these policies 
are mutually consistent and their resultant exchange rates not misaligned. However, there now appears 
to be more concerted moves afoot to address this hiatus. Without surveillance symmetry, it would be a 
pure accident if the pattern of global adjustment, which depends fundamentally on the macroeconomic 
policies of the major countries, were such as to enable a healthy and sustained growth of the world 
economy.  
 
A beneficial fallout of symmetrical surveillance is that it would subject the IMF concepts, procedures 
and standards of evaluation to the scrutiny of its powerful member states whose views it cannot 
ignore. These members will judge whether the rules and practices of the Fund Surveillance and the 
Fund’s economic model are suitable or not. They will also determine the limits to which they will 
allow the institution to intrude into their domestic policies. This would be a welcome externality for 
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